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Abstract
It is common to assume that agents will adopt Nash equilibrium strategies;
however, experimental studies have demonstrated that Nash equilibrium is
often a poor description of human players’ behavior in unrepeated normal-form
games. In this paper, we analyze five widely studied models (Quantal Response
Equilibrium, Level-k, Cognitive Hierarchy, QLk, and Noisy Introspection) that
aim to describe actual, rather than idealized, human behavior in such games.
We performed what we believe is the most comprehensive meta-analysis of these
models, leveraging ten different data sets from the literature recording human
play of two-player games. We began by evaluating the models’ generalization or
predictive performance, asking how well a model fits unseen test data after having
had its parameters calibrated based on separate training data. Surprisingly, we
found that what we dub the QLk model of Stahl and Wilson (1994) consistently
achieved the best performance. Motivated by this finding, we describe methods
for analyzing the posterior distributions over a model’s parameters. We found
that QLk’s parameters were being set to values that were not consistent with
their intended economic interpretations. We thus explored variations of QLk,
ultimately identifying a new model family that has fewer parameters, gives rise to
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more parsimonious parameter values, and achieves better predictive performance.
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Cognitive models, Prediction
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1. Introduction
In strategic settings, it is common to assume that agents will adopt Nash
equilibrium strategies, behaving so that each optimally responds to the others.
This solution concept has many appealing properties; e.g., under any other
strategy profile, one or more agents will regret their strategy choices. However,
experimental evidence shows that Nash equilibrium often fails to describe human
strategic behavior (see, e.g., Goeree and Holt, 2001)—even among professional
game theorists (Becker et al., 2005).
The relatively new field of behavioral game theory extends game-theoretic
models to account for human cognitive biases and limitations (Camerer, 2003).
Experimental evidence is the foundation of behavioral game theory, and re-
searchers have developed many models of how humans behave in strategic
situations based on such data. This multitude of models presents a practical
problem, however: which should we use to predict human behavior? Existing
work in behavioral game theory does not directly answer this question, for two
reasons. First, it has tended to focus on explaining (fitting) in-sample behavior
rather than predicting out-of-sample behavior. This means that models are
vulnerable to overfitting the data: the most flexible model can be chosen instead
of the most accurate one. Second, behavioral game theory has tended not to com-
pare multiple behavioral models, instead either exploring elaborations of a single
model or comparing only to one other model (typically Nash equilibrium). In
this work we perform rigorous—albeit computationally intensive—comparisons
of many different models and model variations on a wide range of experimental
data, leading us to believe that ours is the most comprehensive study of its kind.
Our focus is on the most basic of strategic interactions: unrepeated (“initial”)
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play in simultaneous move games. In the behavioral game theory literature, five
key paradigms have emerged for modeling human decision making in this setting:
quantal response equilibrium (QRE; McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995); the noisy
introspection model (NI; Goeree and Holt, 2004); the cognitive hierarchy model
(CH; Camerer et al., 2004); the closely related level-k (Lk; Costa-Gomes et al.,
2001; Nagel, 1995) models; and what we dub quantal level-k (QLk; Stahl and
Wilson, 1994) models. Although there exist studies exploring different variations
of these models (e.g., Stahl and Wilson, 1995; Ho et al., 1998; Weizsa¨cker, 2003;
Rogers et al., 2009), the overwhelming majority of behavioral models of initial
play of normal-form games fall broadly into this categorization.
The first contribution of our work is methodological: we demonstrate broadly
applicable techniques for comparing and analyzing behavioral models. (See
Section 10.1 for our specific methodological recommendations.) We illustrate the
use of these techniques via an extensive meta-analysis based on data published
in ten different studies, rigorously comparing Lk, QLk, CH, NI, and QRE to
each other and to a model based on Nash equilibrium. The findings that result
from this meta-analysis both demonstrate the usefulness of the approach and
constitute our second contribution. Our first main finding is that QLk is the best
performing of these predictive models, both on most individual source datasets
and also on a dataset pooling all of the ten datasets. We then analyze and
interpret the parameter distributions for several models, including QLk. Based
on this analysis, we construct and evaluate a family of variations on QLk. Our
second main finding is that a simpler (two-parameter) model achieves better
out-of-sample predictive performance than any of the models from the literature
that we considered. We recommend the use of this model, dubbed Poisson-QCH,
by researchers wanting to predict human play in unrepeated normal-form games.
All of the models we consider depend upon exogenous parameters. Most
previous work has focused on models’ ability to describe human behavior, and
hence has sought parameter values that best explain observed experimental data,
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or more formally that maximize a dataset’s probability.1 We depart from this
descriptive focus, seeking to find models, and hence parameter values, that are
effective for predicting previously unseen human behavior. Thus, we follow a
different approach taken from machine learning and statistics. We begin by
randomly dividing the experimental data into a training set and a test set.
We then set each model’s parameters to values that maximize the likelihood
of the training dataset, and finally score the each model according to the
disjoint test dataset’s likelihood. To reduce the variance of this estimate without
biasing its expected value, we employ cross-validation (see, e.g., Bishop, 2006),
systematically repeating this procedure with different test and training sets.
Our meta-analysis has led us to draw three qualitative conclusions. First,
and least surprisingly, Nash equilibrium is less able to explain human play
than are behavioral models. Second, two high-level themes that underlie the
five behavioral models, which we dub “cost-proportional errors” and “limited
iterative strategic thinking”, appear to model independent phenomena. Third,
and building on the previous conclusion, the quantal level-k model of Stahl
and Wilson (1994) (QLk)—which combines both of these themes—made the
most accurate predictions. Specifically, QLk substantially outperformed all other
models on a new dataset spanning all data in our possession, and also had the
best or nearly the best performance on each individual dataset. Our findings
were quite robust to variation in the games played by human subjects. We
broke down model performance by game properties such as dominance structure
and number/types of equilibria, and obtained essentially the same results as
on the combined dataset. We do note that our datasets consisted entirely of
two-player games. Previous work suggests that human subjects reason about
n-player games as if they were two-player games, failing to fully account for
the independence of the other players’ actions (Ho et al., 1998; Costa-Gomes
et al., 2009); we might thus expect to observe qualitatively similar results in
1All of the models that we consider make probabilistic predictions; thus, we must score
models according to how much probability mass they assign to observed events, rather than
assessing accuracy.
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the n-player case. Nevertheless, empirically confirming this expectation is an
important future direction.
The approach we have described so far is designed to compare model perfor-
mance, but yields little insight into how or why a model works. For example,
maximum likelihood estimates provide no information about the extent to which
parameter values can be changed without a large drop in predictive accuracy,
or even about the extent to which individual parameters influence a model’s
performance. We thus introduce an alternate, Bayesian approach for gaining
understanding about a behavioral model’s entire parameter space. We combine
experimental data with explicitly quantified prior beliefs to derive a posterior
distribution that assigns probability to parameter settings in proportion to their
consistency with the data and the prior (Gill, 2002). Applying this approach,
we analyze the posterior distributions for three models: a model based on Nash
equilibrium, QLk, and Poisson–Cognitive Hierarchy (Poisson-CH). Although
Poisson-CH did not demonstrate competitive performance in our initial model
comparisons, we analyze it because it is one-dimensional and because of a very
concrete and influential recommendation in the literature: Camerer et al. (2004)
recommended setting the model’s single parameter, which represents agents’
mean number of steps of strategic reasoning, to 1.5. Our own analysis sharply
contradicts this recommendation, placing the 99% confidence interval almost a
factor of three lower, on the range [0.51, 0.59]. We devote most of our attention
to QLk, however, due to its extremely strong performance. Our new analysis
points out multiple anomalies in QLk’s optimal parameter settings, suggesting
that a simpler model could be preferable. We thus exhaustively evaluated a
family of variations on QLk, thereby identifying a simpler, more predictive family
of models based in part on the cognitive hierarchy concept. In particular, we
introduce a new three-parameter model that gives rise to a more plausible poste-
rior distribution over parameter values, while also achieving better predictive
performance than five-parameter QLk.
In the next section, we define the models that we study. Section 3 lays
out the formal framework within which we work, and Section 4 describes our
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data, methods, and the Nash-equilibrium-based model to which we compare the
behavioral models. Section 5 presents the results of our comparisons. Section 6
introduces our methods for Bayesian parameter analysis, and Section 7 describes
the anomalies we identified by applying this analysis to our datasets. Section 8
explains the space of QLk variations that we investigated, and introduces our
new, high-performing three-parameter model. In Section 9 we survey related
work from the literature and explain how our own work contributes to it. We
conclude in Section 10. We defer derivations to appendices. A final appendix
investigates the sensitivity of our results to dataset composition, studying how
model performance varies with important game properties such as degree of
dominance solvability and Nash equilibrium structure.
2. Models for Predicting Human Play of Simultaneous-Move Games
Formally, a behavioral model is a mapping from a game description G and
a vector of parameters θ to a predicted distribution over each action profile a
in G, which we denote Pr(a |G, θ). In what follows, we define five prominent
behavioral models of human play in unrepeated, simultaneous-move games.2
2.1. Quantal Response Equilibrium
One important idea from behavioral economics is that people become more
likely to make errors as those errors become less costly; we call this making
cost-proportional errors. This can be modeled by assuming that agents best
respond quantally, rather than via strict maximization.
Definition 1 (Quantal best response). Let ui(ai, s−i) be agent i’s expected
utility in game G when playing action ai against strategy profile s−i. Then a
2We focus here on models of behavior in general one-shot, normal-form games. We
omit models of learning in repeated normal-form games such as impulse-balance equilibrium
(Selten and Buchta, 1994), payoff-sampling equilibrium (Osborne and Rubinstein, 1998),
action-sampling equilibrium (Selten and Chmura, 2008), and experience-weighted attraction
(Camerer and Hua Ho, 1999), and models restricted to single game classes, such as cooperative
equilibrium (Capraro, 2013). We also omit variants and generalizations of the models we study,
such as those introduced by Rogers et al. (2009), Weizsa¨cker (2003), and Cabrera et al. (2007);
however, see Section 8, where we systematically explored a particular space of variants.
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(logit) quantal best response QBRGi (s−i;λ) by agent i to s−i is a mixed strategy
si such that
si(ai) =
exp[λ · ui(ai, s−i)]∑
a′i
exp[λ · ui(a′i, s−i)]
, (1)
where λ (the precision parameter) indicates how sensitive agents are to utility
differences, with λ = 0 corresponding to uniform randomization and λ → ∞
corresponding to best response. When its value is clear from context, we will omit
the precision parameter. Note that unlike best response, which is a set-valued
function, quantal best response always returns a unique mixed strategy.
The notion of quantal best response gives rise to a generalization of Nash
equilibrium known as the quantal response equilibrium (“QRE”) (McKelvey and
Palfrey, 1995).
Definition 2 (QRE). A quantal response equilibrium with precision λ is a mixed
strategy profile s∗ in which every agent’s strategy is a quantal best response to
the strategies of the other agents; i.e., s∗i = QBR
G
i (s
∗
−i;λ) for all agents i.
A QRE is guaranteed to exist for any normal-form game and non-negative
precision (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995). However, QRE are not guaranteed to
be unique. As is standard in the literature, we select the (unique) QRE that lies
on the principal branch of the QRE homotopy at the specified precision. The
principal branch has the attractive feature of approaching the risk-dominant
equilibrium as λ→∞ in 2× 2 games with two strict equilibria (Turocy, 2005).
Although Equation (1) is translation invariant, it is not scale invariant. That
is, while adding some constant value to the payoffs of a game will not change its
QRE, multiplying payoffs by a positive constant will. This is problematic because
utility functions are only unique up to affine transformations (Von Neumann and
Morgenstern, 1944); hence, equivalent utility functions that have been multiplied
by different constants will induce different QREs. The QRE concept nevertheless
makes sense if human players are believed to play games differently depending
on the magnitudes of the payoffs involved.
2.2. Level-k
Another key idea from behavioral economics is that humans can perform
only a limited number of iterations of strategic reasoning. The level-k model
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(Costa-Gomes et al., 2001) captures this idea by associating each agent i with a
level ki ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .}, corresponding to the number of iterations of reasoning
the agent is able to perform. A level-0 agent plays randomly, choosing uniformly
at random from his possible actions. A level-k agent, for k ≥ 1, best responds to
the strategy played by level-(k − 1) agents. If a level-k agent has more than one
best response, he mixes uniformly over them.
We consider a particular level-k model, dubbed Lk, which assumes that all
agents belong to levels 0,1, and 2.3 Each agent with level k > 0 has an associated
probability k of making an “error”, i.e., of playing an action that is not a best
response to the level-(k − 1) strategy. Agents are assumed not to account for
these errors when forming their beliefs about how lower-level agents will act.
Definition 3 (Lk model). Let Ai denote player i’s action set and let BR
G
i (s−i)
denote the set of i’s best responses in game G to the strategy profile s−i. Let
IBRGi,k denote the iterative best response set for a level-k agent i, with IBR
G
i,0 =
Ai and IBR
G
i,k = BR
G
i (IBR
G
−i,k−1). Then the distribution pi
Lk
i,k ∈ Π(Ai) that
the Lk model predicts for a level-k agent i is defined as
piLki,0 (ai) = |Ai|−1,
piLki,k (ai) =
{
(1− k)/|IBRGi,k| if ai ∈ IBRGi,k,
k/(|Ai| − |IBRGi,k|) otherwise.
The overall predicted distribution of actions is a weighted sum of the distributions
for each level:
Pr(ai |G,α1, α2, 1, 2) =
2∑
`=0
α` · piLki,` (ai),
where α0 = 1 − α1 − α2. This model thus has 4 parameters: {α1, α2}, the
proportions of level-1 and level-2 agents, and {1, 2}, the error probabilities for
level-1 and level-2 agents.
2.3. Cognitive Hierarchy
The cognitive hierarchy model (Camerer et al., 2004), like level-k, models
agents with heterogeneous bounds on iterated reasoning. It differs from the
level-k model in two ways. First, according to this model agents do not make
3 We here model only level-k agents, unlike Costa-Gomes et al. (2001) who also modeled
other decision rules. Like Costa-Gomes et al. (2001), we restrict agents’ levels to be no greater
than 2; however, see Section 8, in which we extend this level-k model to higher levels.
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errors; each agent always best responds to its beliefs. Second, agents of level-m
best respond to the full distribution of agents at levels 0 to (m − 1), rather
than only to level-(m− 1) agents. More formally, every agent has an associated
level m ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .}. Let f be a probability mass function describing the
distribution of the levels in the population. Level-0 agents play uniformly at
random. Level-m agents (m ≥ 1) best respond to the strategies that would be
played in a population described by the truncated probability mass function
f(j | j < m).
Camerer et al. (2004) advocate a single-parameter restriction of the cognitive
hierarchy model called Poisson-CH, in which f is a Poisson distribution.
Definition 4 (Poisson-CH model). Let piPCHi,m ∈ Π(Ai) be the distribution over
actions predicted for an agent i with level m by the Poisson-CH model. Let
f(m) = Poisson(m; τ). Let BRGi (s−i) denote the set of i’s best responses in
game G to the strategy profile s−i. Let
piPCHi,0:m =
m∑
`=0
f(`)
piPCHi,`∑m
`′=0 f(`
′)
be the truncated distribution over actions predicted for an agent conditional on
that agent’s having level 0 ≤ ` ≤ m. Then piPCH is defined as
piPCHi,0 (ai) = |Ai|−1,
piPCHi,m (ai) =
{
|BRGi (piPCHi,0:m−1)|−1 if ai ∈ BRGi (piPCHi,0:m−1),
0 otherwise.
The overall predicted distribution of actions is a weighted sum of the distributions
for each level,
Pr(ai |G, τ) =
∞∑
`=0
f(`) · piPCHi,` (ai).
The Poisson distribution’s mean, τ , is thus this model’s single parameter.
Rogers et al. (2009) note that cognitive hierarchy and QRE often make similar
predictions. One possible explanation for this is that cost-proportional errors are
adequately captured by cognitive hierarchy (and other iterative models), even
though they do not explicitly model this effect. Alternatively, these phenomena
could be sufficiently distinct that explicitly modeling both limited iterative
strategic thinking and cost-proportional errors yields improved predictions.
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2.4. Quantal Level-k
Stahl and Wilson (1994) propose a rich model of strategic reasoning that
combines elements of the QRE and level-k models; we refer to it as the QLk
model (for quantal level-k). In QLk, agents have one of three levels, as in Lk.4
Each agent responds to its beliefs quantally, as in QRE.
A key difference between QLk and Lk is in the error structure. In Lk, higher-
level agents believe that all lower-level agents best respond perfectly, although
in fact every agent has some probability of making an error. In contrast, in
QLk, agents are aware of the quantal nature of the lower-level agents’ responses,
but have (possibly incorrect) beliefs about the lower-level agents’ precision.
That is, level-1 and level-2 agents use potentially different precisions (λ’s), and
furthermore level-2 agents’ beliefs about level-1 agents’ precision can be wrong.
Definition 5 (QLk model). The probability distribution piQLki,k ∈ Π(Ai) over
actions that QLk predicts for a level-k agent i is
piQLki,0 (ai) = |Ai|−1,
piQLki,1 = QBR
G
i (pi
QLk
−i,0 ;λ1),
piQLki,1(2) = QBR
G
i (pi
QLk
−i,0 ;λ1(2)),
piQLki,2 = QBR
G
i (pi
QLk
i,1(2);λ2),
where piQLki,1(2) is a mixed-strategy profile representing level-2 agents’ prediction of
how other agents will play. This can be interpreted either as the level-2 agents’
beliefs about the behavior of level-1 agents alone, or it can be understood as
modeling level-2 agents’ beliefs about both level-1 and level-0 agents, with the
presence of additional level-0 agents being captured by a lower precision λ1(2).
Stahl and Wilson (1994) advocate the latter interpretation. The overall predicted
distribution of actions is the weighted sum of the distributions for each level,
Pr(ai |G,α1, α2, λ1, λ2, λ1(2)) =
2∑
k=0
αkpi
QLk
i,k (ai),
where α0 = 1− α1 − α2. QLk has five parameters: {α1, α2, λ1, λ2, λ1(2)}.
4Stahl and Wilson (1994) also consider an extended version of this model that adds a type
that plays the equilibrium strategy. In order to avoid the complication of having to specify
an equilibrium selection rule, we do not consider this extension, as many of the games in
our dataset have multiple equilibria. See Section 4.2 for bounds on the performance of Nash
equilibrium predictions on our dataset.
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2.5. Noisy Introspection
Goeree and Holt (2004) propose a model called noisy introspection that
combines cost-proportional errors and an iterative view of strategic cognition in
a different way. Rather than assuming a fixed limit on the number of iterations
of strategic thinking, they instead model cognitive bounds by injecting noise
into iterated beliefs about others’ beliefs and decisions, with the effect that
deeper levels of reasoning are assumed to be noisier. They then show that this
process of noise injection converges to a unique prediction after a finite number
of iterations, which for most games is relatively small.
Goeree and Holt also introduce a concrete version of this model (which we
dub NI), in which deeper levels of reasoning are exponentially noisier.
Definition 6 (NI model). Define piNI,ni,k as
piNI,ni,k =
{
QBRGi (pi
NI,n
−i,k+1;λ0/t
k) if k < n,
QBRGi (p0;λ0/t
n) otherwise,
where p0 is an arbitrary mixed profile, λ0 ≥ 0 is a precision, and t > 1 is a
“telescoping” parameter that determines how quickly noise increases with depth
of reasoning. Then the NI model predicts that each agent will play according to
piNIi = lim
n→∞pi
NI,n
i,0 .
For a fixed game G, precision λ0, and telescoping parameter t, this converges
to a unique strategy profile regardless of the choice of p0, since in the limit the
precision becomes low enough to bring any profile arbitrarily close to the uniform
distribution.
3. Comparing Models
3.1. Prediction Framework
How do we determine whether a behavioral model is well supported by
experimental data? An experimental dataset D = {(Gi, {aij | j = 1, . . . , Ji}) | i =
1, . . . , I} is a set containing I elements. Each element is a tuple containing a
game Gi and a set of Ji pure actions aij , each played by a human subject in
Gi. There is no reason to maintain the pairing of the play of a human player
with that of his opponent, as games are unrepeated. Recall that a behavioral
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model is a mapping from a game description Gi and a vector of parameters θ to
a predicted distribution over each action ai in Gi, which we denote Pr(ai |Gi, θ).
A behavioral model can only be used to make predictions when its parameters
are instantiated. How should we set these parameters? Our goal is a model
that produces accurate probability distributions over the actions of human
agents, rather than simply determining the single action most likely to be played.
This means that we cannot score different models (or, equivalently, different
parameter settings for the same model) using a criterion such as a 0–1 loss
function (accuracy), which asks how many actions were accurately predicted.
For example, the 0–1 loss function evaluates models based purely upon which
action is assigned the highest probability, and does not take account of the
probabilities assigned to the other actions. Instead, we evaluate a given model
on a given dataset by likelihood. That is, we compute the probability of the
observed actions according to the distribution over actions predicted by the
model. The higher the probability of the actual observations according to the
prediction output by a model, the better the model predicted the observations.
This takes account of the full predicted distribution; in particular, for any given
observed distribution, the prediction that maximizes the likelihood score is the
observed distribution itself.5
Assume that there is some true set of parameter values, θ∗, under which the
model outputs the true distribution Pr(a |G, θ∗) over action profiles, and that
θ∗ is independent of G. The maximum likelihood estimate of the parameters
based on D,
θˆ = arg max
θ
Pr(D | θ),
is an unbiased point estimate of the true set of parameters θ∗, whose variance
5Although the likelihood is the quantity that interests us, in practice we operate on the log
of the likelihood to avoid numerical precision problems that arise in dealing with exceedingly
small quantities. Since log likelihood is a monotonic function of likelihood, a model that has
higher likelihood than another model will also have higher log likelihood, and vice versa.
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decreases as I grows. We then use θˆ to evaluate the model:6
Pr(a |G,D) = Pr(a |G, θˆ) =
I∏
i=1
Ji∏
j=1
Pr(aij |Gi, θ). (2)
3.2. Assessing Generalization Performance
Each of the models that we consider depends on parameters that are estimated
from the data. This presents a problem for evaluating models’ performance,
since a more flexible model might fit a given dataset better without necessarily
predicting unseen data better. Models that perform well by fitting a specific
dataset well, but perform poorly at predicting out-of-sample data (i.e., data that
was not used for fitting the model’s parameters), are said to overfit the data.
There are several approaches to avoiding the overfitting problem. One is to
compare models’ fits to the experimental data, but to apply a penalty to models
with larger numbers of parameters. The widely used Bayesian Information Crite-
rion (BIC) and Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) (e.g., Murphy, 2012) take this
approach. However, both criteria are only guaranteed to apply asymptotically in
the limit of infinite quantities of data; furthermore, the BIC is only applicable
to nested models, where one model is a strict generalization of the other. A
similar approach is taken by the χ-squared test, which tests the hypothesis that
a more-general model’s fit is significantly better than that of a restricted model.
However, this is difficult to apply to testing multiple models, in addition to again
requiring the models to be nested. A third approach to evaluating predictive
performance is to formulate hypotheses based on implications derived directly
from a model’s definition (see Haile et al., 2008; Hargreaves Heap et al., 2014, for
examples of such an approach). This can be a very effective way of evaluating
the predictive performance of a single model; however, due to the binary nature
of hypothesis testing, it is less appropriate for comparing multiple models.
In this work, we take a fourth approach, which is widespread in machine
learning. We estimate parameters on a dataset containing a subset of the
6We derive Equation (2) in Appendix A.
13
data (the training data), and then evaluate the resulting model by computing
likelihood scores on the observations associated with the remaining, disjoint test
data. That is, every model’s performance is evaluated entirely based on data
that were not used for estimating parameters. We partition data at the level of
games: data from a given game appears either in the training set or the test set,
but not both.7,8
Randomly dividing our experimental data into training and test sets in-
troduces variance into the prediction score, since the exact value of the score
depends partly upon the random division. To reduce this variance, we perform
10 rounds of 10-fold cross-validation.9 Specifically, for each round, we randomly
partition the games into 10 parts of approximately equal size. For each of the
10 ways of selecting 9 parts from the 10, we compute the maximum likelihood
estimate of the model’s parameters based on the observations associated with
the games belonging to those 9 parts. We then determine the likelihood of the
observations in the remaining part given the prediction. We call the average
of this quantity across all 10 parts the cross-validated likelihood. The average
across rounds of the cross-validated likelihoods is distributed according to a
Student’s-t distribution (see, e.g., Witten and Frank, 2000). We compare the
predictive power of different behavioral models on a given dataset by comparing
the average cross-validated likelihood of the dataset under each model. We
say that one model predicts significantly better than another when the 95%
confidence intervals for the average cross-validated likelihoods do not overlap.
7 This means that observations for a given game will appear in exactly one part of the
partition. However, observations from the same subject may appear in multiple parts, when
subjects play more than one game.
8In an earlier version of this work, we partitioned our dataset at the level of observations.
Partitioning at the level of games provides stronger protection against overfitting.
9 Repeatedly fitting parameters on a bootstrapped subsample and then evaluating perfor-
mance on the remaining data is another approach to reducing the variance associated with the
division into test and training sets. This is a more effective approach for reducing the variance
of parameter estimates; however, it introduces bias into performance estimates (Efron and
Tibshirani, 1997), which are our primary focus in this work.
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4. Experimental Setup
In this section we describe the data and methods that we used in our model
evaluations. We also describe a baseline model based on Nash equilibrium.
4.1. Data
As described in detail in Section 9, we conducted an extensive survey of
papers that make use of the five behavioral models we consider.10 We thereby
identified ten large-scale, publicly available sets of human-subject experimental
data (Stahl and Wilson, 1994, 1995; Costa-Gomes et al., 1998; Goeree and Holt,
2001; Haruvy et al., 2001; Cooper and Van Huyck, 2003; Haruvy and Stahl, 2007;
Costa-Gomes and Weizsa¨cker, 2008; Stahl and Haruvy, 2008; Rogers et al., 2009).
We study all ten11 of these datasets in this paper. See Table 1 for a summary.
Goeree and Holt (2001) presented 10 games in which subjects’ behavior was
close to that predicted by Nash equilibrium, and 10 other small variations on
the same games in which subjects’ behavior was not well-predicted by Nash
equilibrium. We included the 10 games that were in normal form. In Cooper
and Van Huyck (2003), agents played the normal forms of 8 games, followed by
extensive form games with the same induced normal forms; we include only the
data from the normal-form games. The remaining studies consisted exclusively
of normal-form games.
10One might wonder whether models tended to do better in datasets from studies that
explicitly considered them. This turned out not to be the case; a given model’s performance in
a given individual source dataset had essentially no relationship to whether the source dataset
had explicitly studied the model.
11 We identified an additional dataset (Costa-Gomes and Crawford, 2006) which we do not
include due to a computational issue. The games in this dataset had between 200 and 800
actions per player, which made it intractable to compute many solution concepts. As with
Nash equilibrium, the main bottleneck in computing behavioral solution concepts is computing
expected utilities. Each epoch of training for this dataset requires calculating expected values
over up to 640, 000 outcomes per game, in contrast to between 9 and approximately 14, 000
outcomes per game in the All10 dataset. We attempted to overcome this problem by deriving
a coarse version of this data by binning similar actions; however, binning in this way resulted
in games that were not strategically equivalent to the originals (e.g., when multiple iterations
of best response would result in the same binned action in the coarsened games but different
unbinned actions in the original games). An open problem for future work is finding a way to
address this computational problem by representing the games compactly (e.g., Kearns et al.,
2001; Koller and Milch, 2001; Jiang et al., 2011), such that expected utility can be computed
efficiently over even a very large action space.
15
All games had two players, so each single play of a game generated two
observations. We built one dataset for each study. We also constructed a
combined dataset, dubbed All10, containing data from all the datasets. The
datasets contained very different numbers of observations, ranging from 400
(Stahl and Wilson, 1994) to 2992 (Cooper and Van Huyck, 2003). To ensure
that each fold had approximately the same population of subjects, we evaluated
All10 using stratified cross-validation: we performed the game partitioning and
selection process separately for each of the contained source datasets, thereby
ensuring that the number of games from each source dataset was approximately
equal in each partition element.
Several studies (Stahl and Wilson, 1994, 1995; Haruvy et al., 2001; Haruvy
and Stahl, 2007; Stahl and Haruvy, 2008) paid participants according to a
randomized procedure in which experimental subjects played normal-form games
for points representing a 1% chance (per game) of winning a cash prize. In
Costa-Gomes et al. (1998), each payoff unit was worth 40 cents, but participants
were paid based on the outcome of only one randomly-selected game. In the
remaining studies (Goeree and Holt, 2001; Cooper and Van Huyck, 2003; Costa-
Gomes and Weizsa¨cker, 2008; Rogers et al., 2009), game payoffs were worth
a deterministic number of cents. We summarize the expected value of payoff
points in the “Units” column of Table 1. The QRE and QLk models depend
on a precision parameter that is not scale invariant. E.g., if λ is the correct
precision for a game whose payoffs are denominated in cents, then λ/100 would
be the correct precision for a game whose payoffs are denominated in dollars.
To ensure consistent estimation of precision parameters, especially in the All10
dataset where observations from multiple studies were combined, we normalized
the payoff values for each game to be in expected cents.
4.2. Comparing to Nash Equilibrium
It is desirable to compare the predictive performance of our behavioral models
to that of Nash equilibrium. However, such a comparison is not as simple as one
might hope, because any attempt to use Nash equilibrium for prediction must
16
Table 1: Names and contents of each dataset. Units are in expected value, in US dollars.
Name Source Games n Units
SW94 Stahl and Wilson (1994) 10 400 $0.025
SW95 Stahl and Wilson (1995) 12 576 $0.02
CGCB98 Costa-Gomes et al. (1998) 18 1566 $0.022
GH01 Goeree and Holt (2001) 10 500 $0.01
CVH03 Cooper and Van Huyck (2003) 8 2992 $0.10
HSW01 Haruvy et al. (2001) 15 869 $0.02
HS07 Haruvy and Stahl (2007) 20 2940 $0.02
CGW08
Costa-Gomes and Weizsa¨cker
(2008)
14 1792 $0.0107
SH08 Stahl and Haruvy (2008) 18 1288 $0.02
RPC08 Rogers et al. (2009) 17 1210 $0.01
All10 Union of above 142 13863 per source
extend the solution concept to address two problems. The first problem is that
many games have multiple Nash equilibria; in these cases, the Nash prediction
is not well defined. The second problem is that Nash equilibrium frequently
assigns probability zero to some actions. Indeed, in 82% of the games in our
All10 dataset every Nash equilibrium assigned probability 0 to actions that were
actually taken by one or more experimental subjects. This is a problem because
we assess the quality of a model by how well it explains the data; unmodified,
the Nash equilibrium model considers our experimental data to be impossible,
and hence receives a likelihood of zero.
We addressed the second problem by augmenting the Nash equilibrium
solution concept to say that with some probability, each player chooses an action
uniformly at random; this prevents the solution concept from assessing any
experimental data as impossible. This probability is a free parameter of the
model; as we did with behavioral models, we fit this parameter using maximum
likelihood estimation on a training set. We thus call the model Nash Equilibrium
with Error, or NEE. We sidestepped the first problem by assuming that agents
always coordinate to play an equilibrium and by reporting statistics across
different equilibria. Specifically, we report the performance achieved by choosing
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the equilibrium that respectively best and worst fit the test data, thereby giving
upper and lower bounds on the test-set performance achievable by any Nash-
based prediction. (Note that because we “cheat” by choosing equilibria based on
test-set performance, these fits are not able to generalize to new data, and hence
cannot be used in practice.) Finally, we also reported the prediction performance
on the test data, averaged over all of the Nash equilibria of the game.12
4.3. Computational Environment
We performed computation using WestGrid (www.westgrid.ca), primarily on
the orcinus cluster, which has 9600 64-bit Intel Xeon CPU cores. We used
Gambit (McKelvey et al., 2007) to compute QRE and to enumerate the Nash
equilibria of games, and computed maximum likelihood estimates using the
Nelder–Mead simplex algorithm (Nelder and Mead, 1965).
5. Model Comparisons
In this section we describe the results of our experiments comparing the
predictive performance of the five behavioral models from Section 2 and of
the Nash-based models of Section 4.2. Figure 1 compares our behavioral and
Nash-based models. For each model and each dataset, we give the factor by
which the dataset was judged more likely according to the model’s prediction
than it was according to a uniform random prediction. Thus, for example, the
All10 dataset was approximately 1090 times more likely to have been generated
by an agent acting according to our Poisson-CH model than choosing actions
uniformly at random. For the Nash Equilibrium with Error model, the error
bars show the upper and lower bounds on predictive performance obtained by
selecting an equilibrium to maximize or minimize test-set performance, and the
main bar shows the expected predictive performance of selecting an equilibrium
12One might wonder whether the -equilibrium solution concept (see e.g. Shoham and
Leyton-Brown, 2008, Section 3.4.7) solves either of these problems. It does not. First, -
equilibrium can still assign probability 0 to some actions. Second, relaxing the equilibrium
concept only increases the number of equilibria; indeed, every game has infinitely many -
equilibria for any  > 0. Furthermore, to our knowledge, no algorithm for characterizing this
set exists, making equilibrium selection impractical.
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Figure 1: Average likelihood ratios of model predictions to random predictions, with 95%
confidence intervals. Error bars for NEE show upper and lower bounds on performance
depending upon equilibrium selection; the main bar for NEE shows the average performance
over all equilibria. Note that conclusions should not be drawn about relative differences in
likelihood across datasets, as likelihood depends on the dataset’s number of samples and the
underlying games’ numbers of actions. Relative differences in likelihood are meaningful within
datasets.
uniformly at random. For other models, the error bars indicate 95% confidence
intervals across cross-validation partitions; in most cases, these intervals are
imperceptibly narrow.
5.1. Comparing Behavioral Models
Poisson-CH and Lk achieved very similar performance in most datasets. In
one way this is an intuitive result, since the models are very similar to each
other. On the other hand, it suggests something less obvious, that two differences
between the models are not very important in practice: (1) reasoning about just
one lower level versus reasoning about the distribution of all lower levels; (2) the
distinct error models.
QRE and NI tended to perform well on the same datasets. On all but two
datasets (HSW01 and CGW08), the ordering between QRE and the iterative
models was the same as between NI and the iterative models. We found this
result surprising, since the two models appear quite different. However, the
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two models do share several key elements in common. First, both models are
based around cost-proportional errors, and they both assume that all agents
play from the same distribution, unlike the iterative models, which assume that
different agents reason to different depths. Further, although NI is not explicitly
a fixed-point model, it does assume an unlimited depth of reasoning, like QRE,
although it does typically converge after a relatively small number of iterations.
In five datasets, the models based on cost-proportional errors (QRE and NI)
predicted human play significantly better than the two models based on bounded
iterated reasoning (Lk and Poisson-CH). However, in five other datasets, including
All10, the situation was reversed, with Lk and Poisson-CH outperforming QRE
and NI. In the remaining two datasets, NI outperformed the iterative models,
which outperformed QRE. This mixed result is consistent with earlier, less
extensive comparisons of QRE with these two models (Chong et al., 2005;
Crawford and Iriberri, 2007a; Rogers et al., 2009, see also Section 9), and
suggests to us that, in answer to the question posed in Section 2.3, there may
be value to modeling both bounded iterated reasoning and cost-proportional
errors explicitly. If we were right about this hypothesis, we might expect that
our remaining model, which incorporates both components, would predict better
than models that are based on only one component. This was indeed the case:
QLk generally outperformed the single-component models. Overall, QLk was the
strongest behavioral model; in a majority of datasets, no model made significantly
better predictions. The datasets in which some model other than QLk did make
significantly better predictions were CVH03, SW95, CGCB98, and GH01; we
discuss the latter in detail below, in Section 5.2.
We typically estimated different parameter values than the papers that
introduced the models we studied. One reason13 this occurred is that our
training set contains a only subset of these games. This sensitivity to taking
subsets of games indicates that overfitting is indeed a realistic concern.
13In at least one case, our values are also different due to errors in an original paper’s
estimation: Stahl and Wilson (1994) estimated level proportions that sum to more than 1.
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5.2. Comparing to Nash Equilibrium
It is already widely believed that Nash equilibrium is a poor description
of humans’ initial play in normal-form games (e.g., Goeree and Holt, 2001).
Nevertheless, for the sake of completeness, we also evaluated the predictive
power of Nash equilibrium with error (NEE) on our datasets. Referring again
to Figure 1, we see that NEE’s predictions were worse than those of every
behavioral model on every dataset except SW95 and CGCB98. NEE’s upper
bound—using the post-hoc best equilibrium—was significantly worse than QLk’s
performance on every dataset except SW95, CGCB98, RPC09, and GH01.
NEE’s strong performance on SW95 was surprising; it may have been a
result of the unusual subject pool, which consisted of fourth- and fifth-year
undergraduate finance and accounting majors. In contrast, it is unsurprising
that NEE performed well on GH01, since this distribution was deliberately
constructed so that human play on half of its games (the “treasure” conditions)
would be relatively well described by Nash equilibrium.14 Figure 2 separates
GH01 into its “treasure” and “contradiction” treatments and compares the
performance of the behavioral and Nash-based models on these separated datasets.
In addition to the fact that the “treasure” games were deliberately selected to
favor Nash predictions, many of GH01’s games have multiple equilibria. This
conferred an advantage to our NEE model’s upper bound, because it was allowed
to pick the equilibrium with best test-set performance on a per-instance basis.
Note that although NEE thus had a higher upper bound than QLk on the
“treasure” treatment, its average performance was still quite poor.
6. Analyzing Model Parameters
Making good predictions from behavioral models depends upon obtaining
good estimates of model parameters. These estimates can also be useful in
14Of course, GH01 was also constructed so that human play on the other half of its games
would be poorly described by Nash equilibrium. However, this is still a difference from the
other datasets, in which Nash equilibrium appears to have poorly described an even larger
fraction of games.
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Figure 2: Average likelihood ratios of model predictions to random predictions, with 95%
confidence intervals, on GH01 data separated into “treasure” and “contradiction” treatments.
Error bars for NEE show upper and lower bounds on performance depending upon equilibrium
selection; the main bar for NEE shows the average performance over all equilibria. Note that
relative differences in likelihood are not meaningful across datasets, as likelihood drops with
growth in the dataset’s number of samples and underlying games’ numbers of actions. Relative
differences in likelihood are meaningful within datasets.
themselves, helping researchers to understand both how people behave in strategic
situations and whether a model’s behavior aligns or clashes with its intended
economic interpretation. Unfortunately, the method we have used so far—
maximum likelihood estimation, i.e., finding a single set of parameters that best
explains the training set—is not a good way of gaining this kind of understanding.
The problem is that we have no way of knowing how much of a difference it would
have made to have set the parameters differently, and hence how important each
parameter setting is to the model’s performance. If some parameter is completely
uncorrelated with predictive accuracy, the maximum likelihood estimate will
set it to an arbitrary value, from which we would be wrong to draw economic
conclusions.15
For example, in the previous chapter we noted that our parameter estimates
for QLk implied a much larger proportion of level-0 agents than is conventionally
expected. We also interpreted the large estimated value of the noise parameter
 as indicating that Nash equilibrium fits the data poorly. However, much less
can be concluded from such facts if there turn out to be multiple, very different
15We can gain local information about a parameter’s importance from the confidence
interval around its maximum likelihood estimate: locally important parameters will have
narrow confidence intervals, and locally irrelevant parameters will have wide confidence
intervals. However, this does not tell us anything outside the neighborhood of the estimate.
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ways of configuring these models to make good predictions.
An alternative is to use Bayesian analysis to estimate the entire posterior
distribution over parameter values rather than estimating only a single point.
This allows us to identify the most likely parameter values; how wide a range of
values are argued for by the data (equivalently, how strongly the data argues
for the most likely values); and whether the values that the data argues for are
plausible in terms of our intuitions about parameters’ meanings. We derive an
expression for the posterior distribution in Appendix B. In Section 7 we will apply
these methods to study QLk, NEE, and Poisson-CH: the first because it achieved
such reliably strong performance; the second because it has an error term with
an especially interpretable posterior distribution; and the last because it is the
model about which the most explicit parameter recommendation was made in
the literature. Camerer et al. (2004) recommended setting Poisson-CH’s single
parameter, which represents agents’ mean number of steps of strategic reasoning,
to 1.5. Our own analysis sharply contradicts this recommendation, placing the
99% confidence interval roughly a factor of two lower, on the range [0.70, 0.76].
We devote most of our attention to QLk, however, due to its extremely strong
performance.
6.1. Posterior Distribution Estimation
We estimate the posterior distribution as a set of samples. When a model
has a low-dimensional parameter space, like Poisson-CH, we generate a large
number of evenly-spaced, discrete points (so-called grid sampling). This has
the advantage that we are guaranteed to cover the whole space, and hence
will not miss large, important regions. However, this approach does not work
when a model’s parameter space is large, because evenly-spaced grids require
a number of samples exponential in the number of parameters. Luckily, we do
not care about having good estimates of the whole posterior distribution—what
matters is getting good estimates of regions of high probability mass. This can
be achieved by sampling parameter settings in proportion to their likelihood,
rather than uniformly. A wide variety of techniques exist for performing this sort
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of sampling. For models such as QLk with a multidimensional parameter space,
we used Metropolis-Hastings sampling to estimate the posterior distribution.
The Metropolis-Hastings algorithm is a Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC)
algorithm (e.g., Robert and Casella, 2004) that computes a series of values
from the support of a distribution. Although each value depends upon the
previous value, the values are distributed as if from an independent sample of the
distribution after a sufficiently large number of iterations. MCMC algorithms
(and related techniques, e.g., annealed importance sampling (Neal, 2001)) are
useful for estimating multidimensional distributions for which a closed form of
the density is unknown. They require only that a value proportional to the true
density be computable (i.e., an unnormalized density). This is precisely the case
with the models that we seek to estimate.
We used a flat prior for all parameters.16 Although this prior is improper
on unbounded parameters such as precision, it results in a correctly normalized
posterior distribution;17 the posterior distribution in this case reduces to the
likelihood (e.g., Gill, 2002). For Poisson-CH, where we grid sample an unbounded
parameter, we grid sampled within a bounded range ([0, 10]), which is equivalent
to assigning probability 0 to points outside the bounds. In practice, this turned
out not to matter, as the vast majority of probability mass was concentrated
near 0.
6.2. Visualizing Multi-Dimensional Distributions
In the sections that follow, we present posterior distributions as cumulative
marginal distributions. That is, for every parameter, we plot the cumulative
density function (CDF)—the probability that the parameter should be set less
than or equal to a given value—averaging over values of all other parameters.
Plotting cumulative density functions allows us to visualize an entire continuous
16For precision parameters, another natural choice might have been to use a flat prior on
the log of precision. We chose as we did to avoid artificially preferring precision estimates
closer to zero, since it is common for iterative models to assume agents best respond nearly
perfectly to lower levels.
17That is, for the posterior,
∫ · ·· ∫∞−∞ Pr(θ | D) dθ = 1, even though for the prior∫ · ·· ∫∞−∞ p0(θ) dθ diverges.
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distribution without having to estimate density from discrete samples, thus
sparing us manual decisions such as the width of bins for a histogram. Plotting
marginal distributions allows us to examine intuitive two-dimensional plots about
multi-dimensional distributions. Interaction effects between parameters are thus
obscured; luckily, in further, unpublished experiments we found little in the way
of interaction effects between parameters.
7. Parameter Importance Analysis
In this section we analyze the posterior distributions of the parameters for
three of the models compared in Section 5: Poisson-CH, NEE, and QLk. We then
compare our estimates of the relative proportions of level-0 agents to previous
work.
For Poisson-CH, we computed the likelihood for each value of τ ∈ {0.01k | k ∈
N, 0 ≤ 0.01k ≤ 10}, and then normalized by the sum of the likelihoods. For NEE,
we computed the likelihood for each value of  ∈ {0.01k | k ∈ N, 0 ≤ 0.01k ≤ 1}.
For Lk and QLk, we combined the samples from 4 independent Metropolis-
Hasting chains, each of which computed 220, 000 samples, discarding the first
20, 000 samples as a “burn-in” period to allow the Markov chain to converge.
We used the PyMC software package to generate the samples (Patil et al., 2010).
Computing the posterior distribution for a single model in this way typically
required approximately 200 CPU hours.
7.1. Poisson-CH
In an influential recommendation from the literature, Camerer et al. (2004)
suggest18 setting the τ parameter of the Poisson-CH model to 1.5. Our Bayesian
analysis techniques allow us to estimate CDFs for this parameter on each of
our datasets (see Figure 3). Overall, our analysis strongly contradicts Camerer
et al.’s recommendation. On All10, the posterior probability of 0.70 ≤ τ ≤ 0.76
18Although Camerer et al. phrase their recommendation as a reasonable “omnibus guess,”
it is often cited as an authoritative finding (e.g., Carvalho and Santos-Pinto, 2010; Frey and
Goldstone, 2011; Choi, 2012; Goodie et al., 2012).
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Figure 3: Cumulative posterior distributions for Poisson-CH’s τ parameter. Bold solid trace
is the combined dataset; solid black trace is the outlier Stahl and Wilson (1994) source dataset;
bold dashed trace is a subset containing all large games (those with more than 5 actions per
player).
is more than 99%. Every other source dataset had a wider 99% credible interval
(the Bayesian counterpart to confidence intervals) for τ than All10, as indicated
by the higher slope of All10’s cumulative density function, since smaller datasets
lead to less confident predictions. Nevertheless, all but two of the source datasets
had median values less than 1.0. Only the Stahl and Wilson (1994) dataset
(SW94) supports Camerer et al.’s recommendation (median 1.43). However, as
we have observed before, SW94 appears to be an outlier; its credible interval is
wider than that of the other distributions, and the distribution is very multimodal,
possibly due to the dataset’s small size.
Many of the games in our dataset have small action spaces. For example,
108 out of the 142 games in All10 have exactly 3 actions per player. One might
worry that the estimated average cognitive level in Figure 3 is artificially low,
since it is impossible to distinguish higher numbers of levels than the number of
actions available to each player. We check this by performing the same posterior
estimation on a subset of the data consisting only of the 4 large games (i.e.,
those with more than 5 actions available to each player). As Figure 3 shows, the
estimated average cognitive level in these large games was even lower than the
overall estimate, with a median of 0.22.
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Figure 4: Cumulative posterior distributions for NEE’s  parameter. Bold solid trace is the
combined dataset; bold dashed trace is a subset containing all large games (those with more
than 5 actions per player).
7.2. Nash Equilibrium
NEE has a free parameter, , that describes the probability of an agent
choosing an action uniformly at random. If Nash equilibrium were a good
tool for predicting human behavior, we would expect this parameter to have a
relatively low value; in contrast, the values of  that maximize NEE’s performance
were extremely high. In this section we estimate the full posterior distribution for
; see Figure 4. By doing so we are able to confirm that in both All10 and its
component source datasets, the posterior distribution for  is very concentrated
around very large values of . The fact that well over half of NEE’s prediction
consists of the uniform noise term provides a strong argument against using
Nash equilibrium to predict initial play. This is especially true as the agents
within a Nash equilibrium do not take others’ noisiness into account, which
makes it difficult to interpret  as a measure of level-0 play rather than of model
misspecification.
7.3. QLk
Figure 5 gives the marginal cumulative posterior distributions for QLk’s
level proportion distributions broken down by source dataset. That is, we
computed the five-dimensional posterior distribution, and then extracted from it
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Figure 5: Marginal cumulative posterior distribution functions for the level proportion
parameters (α0, α1, α2) of the QLk model.
the three marginal distributions shown here.19 As with Poisson-CH, posterior
level distributions varied across datasets.20
We observe a surprisingly high posterior frequency of level-0 agents. The
posterior medians for the proportion of level-0, level-1, and level-2 agents in the
19 We omit marginal distributions for the precision parameters λ1, λ2, and λ1(2) for space
reasons. They follow the same broad pattern as the level proportion distributions: the
parameters have relatively diverse posterior distributions and degrees of identification in the
individual datasets, but are very sharply identified in the combined All10 dataset.
20 To confirm that these results were not simply an artifact of a difficult-to-sample posterior
distribution, we simulated data from All10 from a QLk model with known parameters, and
then sampled from the posterior distribution of this synthesized dataset. For all 5 parameters,
the true parameter value was contained within the 95% central credible interval a minimum of
93 times out of 100 repetitions, indicating that the sampler was well calibrated.
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All10 dataset are 0.32, 0.42, and 0.26, respectively. See Section 7.4 for a further
discussion of our level-0 estimates.
Overall, we observed rather small quantal response precisions. In the All10
dataset, the posterior median precisions for level-1 agents, level-2 agents, and the
belief of level-2 agents about level-1 agents were 0.16, 0.56, and 0.05 respectively.
The belief of the level-2 agents that the level-1 agents have a much smaller
precision than their actual precision was particularly strongly identified. That
is, the All10 dataset assigned the highest posterior probability to parameter
settings in which the level-2 agents ascribe a smaller than accurate quantal
response precision to the level-1 agents. QLk may get this right: e.g., two-
level strategic reasoning might cause a high cognitive load, making agents more
likely to make mistakes in their predictions of others’ behavior. Alternately,
we might worry that QLk fails to capture some crucial aspect of experimental
subjects’ strategic reasoning. For example, the low value of λ1(2) might reflect
level-2 agents’ reasoning about all lower levels rather than just one level below
themselves: ascribing a low precision to level-1 agents approximates a mixture
of level-1 agents and uniformly randomizing level-0 agents. That is, the low
value of λ1(2) may be a way of simulating a cognitive hierarchy style of reasoning
within a level-k framework. In the next section, we will explore this possibility
as part of an evaluation of systematic variations of QLk’s modeling assumptions.
7.4. Level-0
Earlier studies found support for widely varying proportions of level-0 agents.
Stahl and Wilson (1994) estimated that 0% of the population was level-0;21
Stahl and Wilson (1995) estimated 17%, with a confidence interval of [6%,
30%]; Haruvy et al. (2001) estimated rates between 6–16% for various model
specifications; and Burchardi and Penczynski (2014) estimated 37% by fitting a
level-k model, and between 20–42% by eliciting subject strategies.
The posterior median for the proportion of level-0 agents in the All10
21Their dataset is an outlier in our own per-dataset parameter fits; see Section 7.1.
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dataset according to the QLk model is 32%, with a 95% credible interval of
[29%, 35%]. This is toward the high end of the range of previous estimates.
However, note that our estimate for QLk is very similar to the fitted estimate of
Burchardi and Penczynski (2014), and comfortably within the range that they
estimated by directly evaluating subjects’ elicited strategies in a single game.
According to the Lk model, the posterior median for the proportion of level-0
agents in All10 is 18%. However, the Lk model suffers from an identifiability
problem, in that there is no way to distinguish uniform noise that is introduced
by the uniform error structure from uniform noise introduced by level-0 agents.
This results in a very wide 95% credible interval of [1%, 42%].
In contrast to our estimates, the number of level-0 agents in the population
is typically assumed to be negligible in studies that use an iterative model of
behavior. Indeed, some studies (e.g., Crawford and Iriberri, 2007b) fix the
number of level-0 agents to be 0. Thus, one possible interpretation of our higher
estimates of level-0 agents is as evidence of a misspecified model. For example,
Poisson-CH uses level-0 agents as the only source of noisy responses. However, we
estimated substantial proportions of level-0 agents even for models (Lk and QLk)
that include explicit error structures. We thus believe that the alternative—that
nonstrategic behavior occurs at a substantial frequency—must be taken seriously.
8. Model Variations
QLk makes various modeling assumptions that may seem arbitrary. For
example, is it the right choice to model exactly two cognitive levels? And, is it
really necessary to model the fact that agents at one level might be incorrect
about the precision of the level below them? We now investigate these and
other such questions, considering a family of models that systematically vary
the assumptions underlying QLk. In the end, we identify a simpler model that
dominated QLk on our data.
More specifically, we considered four different axes along with the QLk model
could be modified. First, QLk assumes a maximum level of 2; we considered
maximum levels of 1 and 3 as well. Second, QLk assumes inhomogeneous
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Table 2: Model variations with prediction performance on the All10 dataset. The models
with max level of ∗ used a Poisson distribution. Models are named according to precision beliefs,
precision homogeneity, population beliefs, and type of level distribution. E.g., ah-QCH3 is the
model with accurate precision beliefs, homogeneous precisions, cognitive hierarchy population
beliefs, and a discrete distribution over levels 0–3.
Name
Max
Level
Population
Beliefs
Precision
Beliefs Precisions Parameters
Log likelihood
vs. u.a.r.
QLk1 1 n/a n/a n/a 2 87.37± 1.04
gi-QLk2 2 Lk general inhomo. 5 108.66± 0.56
ai-QLk2 2 Lk accurate inhomo. 4 103.33± 1.75
gh-QLk2 2 Lk general homo. 4 107.96± 0.46
ah-QLk2 2 Lk accurate homo. 3 104.84± 0.58
gi-QCH2 2 CH general inhomo. 5 107.78± 0.88
ai-QCH2 2 CH accurate inhomo. 4 106.76± 0.92
gh-QCH2 2 CH general homo. 4 109.43± 0.58
ah-QCH2 2 CH accurate homo. 3 106.67± 0.41
gi-QLk3 3 Lk general inhomo. 9 113.17± 1.46
ai-QLk3 3 Lk accurate inhomo. 6 109.62± 1.21
gh-QLk3 3 Lk general homo. 7 113.48± 1.46
ah-QLk3 3 Lk accurate homo. 4 107.12± 0.46
gi-QCH3 3 CH general inhomo. 10 113.01± 0.93
ai-QCH3 3 CH accurate inhomo. 6 111.34± 0.59
gh-QCH3 3 CH general homo. 8 113.08± 0.83
ah-QCH3 3 CH accurate homo. 4 110.42± 0.46
ai-QLk4 4 Lk accurate inhomo. 8 110.30± 0.93
ah-QLk4 4 Lk accurate homo. 5 106.63± 0.71
ah-QLk5 5 Lk accurate homo. 6 107.18± 0.57
ah-QLk6 6 Lk accurate homo. 7 106.57± 0.68
ah-QLk7 7 Lk accurate homo. 8 106.50± 0.69
ah-QLkp * Lk accurate homo. 2 106.89± 0.28
ai-QCH4 4 CH accurate inhomo. 8 111.54± 0.62
ah-QCH4 4 CH accurate homo. 5 110.88± 0.33
ah-QCH5 5 CH accurate homo. 6 111.22± 0.39
ah-QCH6 6 CH accurate homo. 7 111.26± 0.44
ah-QCH7 7 CH accurate homo. 8 111.42± 0.41
ah-QCHp * CH accurate homo. 2 110.48± 0.25
precisions in that it allows each level to have a different precision; we varied this
by also considering homogeneous precision models. Third, QLk allows general
precision beliefs that can differ from lower-level agents’ true precisions; we also
constructed models that make the simplifying assumption that all agents have
accurate precision beliefs about lower-level agents.22 Finally, in addition to Lk
beliefs, where all other agents are assumed by a level-k agent to be level-(k − 1),
we also constructed models with CH beliefs, where agents believe that the
population consists of the true, truncated distribution over the lower levels. We
22This is in the same spirit as the simplifying assumption made in cognitive hierarchy
models that agents have accurate beliefs about the proportions of lower-level agents.
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Figure 6: Model simplicity vs. prediction performance on the All10 dataset. QLk1 is omitted
because its far worse performance (∼ 1087) distorts the figure’s scale.
evaluated each combination of axis values; the 17 resulting models23 are listed
in the top part of Table 2. In addition to the 17 exhaustive axis combinations
for models with maximum levels in {1, 2, 3}, we also evaluated (1) 12 additional
axis combinations that have higher maximum levels and 8 parameters or fewer:
ai-QCH4 and ai-QLk4; ah-QCH and ah-QLk variations with maximum levels
in {4, 5, 6, 7}; and (2) ah-QCH and ah-QLk variations that assume a Poisson
distribution over the levels rather than using an explicit tabular distribution.24
These additional models are listed in the bottom part of Table 2.
8.1. Simplicity Versus Predictive Performance
We evaluated the predictive performance of each model on the All10 dataset
using 10-fold cross-validation repeated 10 times, as in Section 5. The results are
given in the last column of Table 2 and plotted in Figure 6.
All else being equal, a model with higher performance is more desirable, as is
a model with fewer parameters. We can plot an efficient frontier of those models
23When the maximum level is 1, all combinations of the other axes yield identical predictions.
Therefore there are only 17 models instead of 3(23) = 24.
24The ah-QCHp model is identical to the CH-QRE model of Camerer et al. (2016).
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that achieved the best performance for a given number of parameters or fewer;
see Figure 6. The original QLk model (gi-QLk2) is not efficient in this sense; it
is dominated by, e.g., ah-QCH3, which has both significantly better predictive
performance and fewer parameters (because it restricts agents to homogeneous
precisions and accurate beliefs).
There is a striking pattern among the efficient models with 6 parameters
or fewer: every such model has accurate precision beliefs, cognitive hierarchy
population beliefs, and, with the exception of ai-QCH3, homogeneous precisions.
Furthermore, ai-QCH3’s performance was not significantly better than that of
ah-QCH5, which did have homogeneous precisions. This suggests that the most
parsimonious way to model human behavior in normal-form games is to use a
model of this form.
Adding flexibility by modeling general beliefs about precisions did improve
performance; the four best-performing models all incorporated general precision
beliefs. However, these models also had much larger variance in their prediction
performance on the test set. This may indicate that the models are overly
flexible, and hence prone to overfitting.
8.2. Parameter Analysis of ah-QCH Models
In this section we examine the marginal posterior distributions of two models
from the accurate, homogeneous QCH family (see Figure 7). We computed the
posterior distribution of the models’ parameters using the procedure described
in Sections 6.1 and 7. The posterior distribution for the precision parameter λ
was concentrated around 0.20, somewhat greater than the QLk model’s estimate
for λ1. This suggests that QLk’s much lower estimate for λ1(2) may indeed
have been the closest that the model could get to having the level-2 agents best
respond to a mixture of level-0 and level-1 agents (as in cognitive hierarchy).
Our robust finding in Sections 7.4 and 7.3 of a large proportion of level-0
agents was confirmed by these models as well. Indeed, the number of level-0
agents was nearly the only point of close agreement between all three models
with respect to the distribution of levels.
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Figure 7: Marginal cumulative posterior distributions for the level proportion parameters
(α0, α1, α2, α3) of the ah-QCHp, ah-QCH3, and ah-QCH4 models on All10. Solid lines are ah-QCHp;
dashed lines are ah-QCH3; dotted lines are ah-QCH4. All α values are defined implicitly by the
τ parameter for ah-QCHp. For the other models, α0 is defined implicitly by α1, α2, α3,, and
(for ah-QCH4) α4.
9. Related Work
Our work has been motivated by the question, “What model is best for
predicting human behavior in general, simultaneous-move games?” Before
beginning our study, we conducted an exhaustive literature survey to determine
the extent to which this question had already been answered. Specifically, we
used Google Scholar to identify all (1805) citations to the papers introducing the
QRE, CH, Lk, NI, and QLk models (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995; Camerer et al.,
2004; Costa-Gomes et al., 2001; Nagel, 1995; Goeree and Holt, 2004; Stahl and
Wilson, 1994), and manually checked every reference. We discarded superficial
citations, papers that simply applied one of the models to an application domain,
and papers that studied repeated games. This left us with a total of 24 papers,
including the six with which we began, which we summarize in Table 3. Overall,
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we found no paper that compared the predictive performance of all six models.
Indeed, there are two senses in which the literature focuses on different issues.
First, it appears to be more concerned with explaining behavior than with
predicting it. Thus, comparisons of out-of-sample prediction performance were
rare. Here we describe the only exceptions that we found:
• Stahl and Wilson (1995) evaluated prediction performance on 3 games
using parameters fit from the other games;
• Morgan and Sefton (2002) and Hahn et al. (2010) evaluated prediction
performance using held-out test data;
• Camerer et al. (2004) and Chong et al. (2005) computed likelihoods on
each individual game in their datasets after using models fit to the n− 1
remaining games;
• Crawford and Iriberri (2007a) compared the performance of two models by
training each model on each game in their dataset individually, and then
evaluating the performance of each of these n trained models on each of
the n− 1 other individual games; and
• Camerer et al. (2016) evaluated the performance of QRE and cognitive hier-
archy variants on one experimental treatment using parameters estimated
on two separate experimental treatments.
Second, most of the papers compared a single one of the five models (often with
variations) to Nash equilibrium. Indeed, only nine of the 24 studies (see the
bottom portion of Table 3) compared more than one of the six key models, and
none of these considered QLk. Only three of these studies explicitly compared
the prediction performance of more than one of the six models (Chong et al.,
2005; Crawford and Iriberri, 2007a; Camerer et al., 2016); the remaining six
performed comparisons in terms of training set fit (Camerer et al., 2001; Goeree
and Holt, 2004; Costa-Gomes and Weizsa¨cker, 2008; Costa-Gomes et al., 2009;
Rogers et al., 2009; Breitmoser, 2012).
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Rogers et al. (2009) proposed a unifying framework that generalizes both
Poisson-CH and QRE, and compared the fit of several variations within this
framework. Notably, their framework allows for quantal response within a
cognitive hierarchy model. Their work is thus similar to our own search over
a system of QLk variants in Section 8, but there are several differences. First,
we compared out-of-sample prediction performance, not in-sample fit. Second,
Rogers et al. restricted the distributions of types to be grid, uniform, or Poisson
distributions, whereas we considered unconstrained discrete distributions over
levels. Third, they required different types to have different precisions, while
we did not. Finally, we considered level-k beliefs as well as cognitive hierarchy
beliefs, whereas they considered only cognitive hierarchy belief models.
One line of work in computer science also meets our criteria of predicting
action choices and modeling human behavior (Altman et al., 2006). This approach
learns association rules between agents’ actions in different games to predict how
an agent will play based on its actions in earlier games. We did not consider this
approach in our study, as it requires data that identifies agents across games,
and cannot make predictions for games that are not in the training dataset.
10. Conclusions
To our knowledge, ours is the first study to address the question of which
existing behavioral model—QRE, level-k, cognitive hierarchy, noisy introspection,
or quantal level-k behavioral models—is best suited to predicting unseen human
initial play of normal-form games. We explored the prediction performance
of these models, along with several modifications. We found that bounded
iterated reasoning and cost-proportional errors are both valuable ingredients
in a predictive model of human game theoretic behavior: the best-performing
model that we studied (QLk) combines both of these elements. We believe that
iterative reasoning describes an actual cognitive process. The situation is less
clear with cost-proportional errors: they may likewise describe human reasoning,
or they may simply be a closer approximation to human behavior than the usual
uniform error specification.
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Table 3: Existing work in model comparison. ‘f’ indicates comparison of training sample fit
only; ‘t’ indicates statistical tests of training sample performance; ‘p’ indicates evaluation of
out-of-sample prediction performance.
Paper Nash QLk Lk CH NI QRE
Stahl and Wilson (1994) t t
McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) f f
Stahl and Wilson (1995) f p
Costa-Gomes et al. (1998) f f
Haruvy et al. (1999) t
Costa-Gomes et al. (2001) f f
Haruvy et al. (2001) t
Morgan and Sefton (2002) f p
Weizsa¨cker (2003) t t
Camerer et al. (2004) f p
Costa-Gomes and Crawford (2006) f f
Stahl and Haruvy (2008) t
Rey-Biel (2009) t t
Georganas et al. (2015) f f
Hahn et al. (2010) p
Camerer et al. (2001) f f
Goeree and Holt (2004) f f f
Chong et al. (2005) f p p
Crawford and Iriberri (2007a) p p p
Costa-Gomes and Weizsa¨cker (2008) f f f f
Costa-Gomes et al. (2009) f f f f f
Rogers et al. (2009) f f f
Camerer et al. (2016) p p
Breitmoser (2012) t t t t
Bayesian parameter analysis is a valuable technique for investigating the
behavior and properties of models, particularly because it is able to make
quantitative recommendations for parameter values. We showed how Bayesian
parameter analysis can be applied to derive concrete recommendations for the use
of Poisson-CH, differing substantially from widely cited advice in the literature.
QLk (gi-qlk2) provides substantial flexibility in specifying the beliefs and
precisions of different types of agents. We found that this flexibility tends to
hurt generalization performance more than it helps. In a systematic search
of model variations, we identified a new model family (the accurate precision
belief, homogeneous-precision QCH models) that contained the efficient (or
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nearly-efficient) model for every number of parameters smaller than 7. Based on
further analysis of this model family, we identified a model, Poisson-QCH, that
offers excellent generalization performance with only two parameters.
10.1. Recommendations
Methodology. In this work we have focused exclusively on prediction performance.
One might wonder whether there is any practical difference between in-sample
fit and out-of-sample prediction performance. It turns out that the ranking of
a model’s performance within a dataset was identical in the test and training
sets only 45% of the time, despite the low dimensionality of the models that we
considered. The average difference between a model’s rank by test performance
and its rank by training performance was 1.5. The ai-qlk4 model was an
especially notable example, having the 5th-highest training performance but only
the 14th-highest test performance.
We thus conclude that there is no substitute for evaluating a model on held-out
test data. We recommend the use of 10-fold cross-validation, repeated 10 times
with a different random partition over games on each repetition, as described in
Section 3.2. However, we recognize that this process is computationally intensive,
as it requires each model to be fit 100 times. If computation time is a major
constraint, we recommend a single round of 10-fold cross-validation, or even a
single round of 4-fold cross-validation; this still gives an unbiased estimate of
prediction performance, albeit without error bars.
The log-likelihood performance measure has some problematic features: it is
not comparable between datasets, and its units do not have an especially natural
interpretation. Nevertheless, it is the most appropriate performance measure for
predictive behavioral models of which we are aware, especially when normalized
against a baseline such as the performance of uniform predictions.
Models. Section 8 analyzes an “efficient frontier” of models, each of which
represent a different tradeoff between performance and parsimony (and hence
robustness). The Poisson-QCH model (ah-QCHp) is attractive for being low-
variance and reasonably performant, whereas gh-QLk3 has the highest expected
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performance but also the highest variance of any model, and a more difficult-to-
interpret parameter structure.
We recommend the use of the Poisson-QCH model for the prediction of
human strategic behavior in unrepeated, simultaneous-move games.25 The
median posterior parameters for the All10 dataset were λ = 0.20, τ = 1.12.26
These settings may be a good starting point for applications, although we note
that application-specific fits are always preferable due to behavioral variation
across subject populations.
10.2. Further Directions
Our parameter estimates for all of the iterative models included a substantial
proportion of level-0 agents. The level-0 model is important for predicting the
behavior of all agents in an iterative model; both the level-0 agents themselves,
and the higher-level agents whose behavior is grounded in a model of level-0
behavior. In ongoing work, we are investigating richer specifications of level-0
behavior, which allow for significant performance improvements (Wright and
Leyton-Brown, 2014).
Our approach of fitting the parameters of an iterative model in one set of
games and then using these parameters to make predictions in distinct games
implicitly assumes that the distribution of beliefs in the population is constant
across different games. In several studies, experimental subjects do exhibit
surprising stability (Stahl and Wilson, 1994, 1995; Costa-Gomes et al., 2001;
Polonio et al., 2015) or convergence (Breitmoser et al., 2014) in their apparent
levels of reasoning. However, it also seems reasonable to suppose that players’
depths of reasoning would be influenced by the structure of the game. In ongoing
work, we are investigating ways to model such endogeneous reasoning steps.
25Equilibrium-based theories may have more of a role to play in the repeated setting, where
agents have a chance to converge to equilibrium (although see Frey and Goldstone (2013) for
evidence against convergence in a repeated setting).
26This suggested value for τ may seem superficially similar to the value τ = 1.5 suggested
by Camerer et al. (2004) for Poisson-CH. However, they differ quite meaningfully, as τ = 1.12
implies that 33% of the population are level-0, whereas τ = 1.5 implies that only 22% are
level-0.
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Appendix A. Likelihood Derivation
The likelihood of a single datapoint dij = (Gi, aij) is
Pr(dij | θ) = Pr(Gi, aij | θ).
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By the chain rule of probabilities, this27 is equivalent to
Pr(dij | θ) = Pr(aij |Gi, θ) Pr(Gi | θ),
and by independence of G and θ we have
Pr(dij | θ) = Pr(aij |Gi, θ) Pr(Gi). (A.1)
The datapoints are independent, so the likelihood of the dataset is just the
product of the likelihoods of the datapoints,
Pr(D | θ) =
I∏
i=1
Ji∏
j=1
Pr(aij |Gi, θ) Pr(Gi). (A.2)
The probabilities Pr(Gi) are constant with respect to θ, and can therefore be
disregarded when maximizing the likelihood:
arg max
θ
Pr(D | θ) = arg max
θ
I∏
i=1
Ji∏
j=1
Pr(aij |Gi, θ).
Appendix B. Posterior Distribution Derivation
We derive an expression for the posterior distribution Pr(θ | D) by applying
Bayes’ rule, where p0(θ) is the prior distribution:
Pr(θ | D) = p0(θ) Pr(D | θ)
Pr(D) . (B.1)
Substituting in Equation (A.2), which gave an expression for the likelihood of
the dataset Pr(D | θ), we obtain
Pr(θ | D) = p0(θ)
∏I
i=1
∏Ji
j=1 Pr(aij |Gi, θ) Pr(Gi)
Pr(D) . (B.2)
27To those unfamiliar with Bayesian analysis, quantities such as Pr(D), Pr(Gi), and Pr(Gi | θ)
may seem difficult to interpret or even nonsensical. It is common practice in Bayesian statistics
to assign probabilities to any quantity that can vary, such as the games under consideration or
the complete dataset that has been observed. Regardless of how they are interpreted, these
quantities all turn out to be constant with respect to θ, and so have no influence on the
outcome of the analysis.
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In practice Pr(Gi) and Pr(D) are constants, and so can be ignored:
Pr(θ | D) ∝ p0(θ)
I∏
i=1
Ji∏
j=1
Pr(aij |Gi, θ). (B.3)
Note that by commutativity of multiplication, this is equivalent to performing
iterative Bayesian updates one datapoint at a time. Therefore, iteratively
updating this posterior neither over- nor underprivileges later datapoints.
Appendix C. Dataset Composition
As we saw in the case of GH01, model performance was sensitive to choices
made by the authors of our various datasets about which games to study. One
way to control for such choices is to partition our set of games according to
important game properties, and to evaluate model performance in each partition.
In this appendix we describe such an analysis.
Overall, our datasets spanned 142 games. The vast majority of these games
are matrix games, deliberately lacking inherent meaning in order to avoid
framing effects.28 For the most part, these games were chosen to vary according
to dominance solvability and equilibrium structure. In particular, most dataset
authors were concerned with (1) whether a game could be solved by iterated
removal of dominated strategies (either strict or weak) and with how many steps
of iteration were required; and (2) the number and type of Nash equilibria that
each game possesses.29
We thus constructed subsets of the full dataset based on their dominance
solvability and the nature of their Nash equilibria, as described in Table C.4.30
We computed cross-validated MLE fits for each model on each of the feature-based
28Indeed, some studies (e.g., Rogers et al., 2009) even avoided focal payoffs like 0 and 100.
29There were two exceptions. The first was Goeree and Holt (2001), who chose games that
had both equilibria that human subjects find intuitive and strategically equivalent variations
of these games whose equilibria human subjects find counterintuitive. The second exception
was Cooper and Van Huyck (2003), whose normal form games were based on an exhaustive
enumeration of the payoff orderings possible in generic 2-player, 2-action extensive-form games.
30 As Table C.4 shows, there was some variance in the number of games and observations
among the different partitions. The results presented in this appendix indicate that this
variance was likely not a major determinant of our overall results.
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Table C.4: Datasets conditioned on various game features. The column headed “games”
indicates how many games of the full dataset met the criterion, and the column headed “n”
indicates how many observations each feature-based dataset contained. Observe that the game
features are not all mutually exclusive, and so the “games” column does not sum to 142.
Name Description Games n
D1 Weak dominance solvable in one round 2 748
D1s Strict dominance solvable in one round 0 0
D2 Weak dominance solvable in two rounds 38 5058
D2s Strict dominance solvable in two rounds 23 2000
DS Weak dominance solvable 52 6470
DSs Strict dominance solvable 35 3312
ND Not dominance solvable 90 7393
PSNE1 Single Nash equilibrium, which is pure 51 4687
MSNE1 Single Nash equilibrium, which is mixed 21 1387
Multi-Eqm Multiple Nash equilibria 70 7789
datasets of Table C.4. The results are summarized in Figure C.8. In two respects,
the results across the feature-based datasets mirror the results of Section 5.1
and Section 5.2. First, QLk significantly outperformed the other behavioral
models on the majority of datasets; the exceptions were D1, D2, and D2s (but
not DS); and MSNE1. Second, a majority of behavioral models significantly
outperformed NEE in all but three datasets: D1, ND and Multi-eqm. In these
three datasets, the upper and lower bounds on NEE’s performance contained the
performance of either two or all three of the single-factor behavioral models (but
not necessarily QLk). It is unsurprising that NEE’s upper and lower bounds were
widely separated on the Multi-eqm dataset, since the more equilibria a game
has, the more variation there can be in these equilibria’s post-hoc performance;
NEE’s strong best-case performance on this dataset should similarly reflect this
variation. It turns out that 55 of the 90 games (and 4731 of the 7393 observations)
in the ND dataset are from the Multi-eqm dataset, which likely explains NEE’s
high upper bound in that dataset as well. Indeed, this analysis helps to explain
some of our previous observations about the GH01 dataset. NEE contains all
other models in its performance bounds in this dataset, and in addition to the fact
that half the dataset’s games (the “treasure” treatments) that were chosen for
consistency with Nash equilibrium, some of the other games (the “contradiction”
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treatments) turn out to have multiple equilibria. Overall, the overlap between
GH01 and Multi-eqm is 5 games out of 10 and 250 observations out of 500.
Unlike in the per-dataset comparisons of Section 5.1, both of our iterative
single-factor models (Poisson-CH and Lk) significantly outperformed QRE in
almost every feature-based dataset, with D2S and DSS as the only exceptions;
in D2S, QRE outperformed all other models, and in DSS QRE was significantly
outperformed by Lk but not by Poisson-CH. One possible explanation is that
the filtering features are all biased toward iterative models. However, it seems
unlikely that, e.g., both dominance-solvability and dominance-nonsolvability are
biased toward iterative models. Another possibility is that iterative models are
a better model of human behavior, but the cost-proportional error model of
QRE is sufficiently superior to the respectively simple and non-existent error
models of Lk and Poisson-CH that it outperforms on many datasets that mix
game types. However, we observed no straightforward relationship between the
different proportions of dominance-solvable and non-dominance-solvable games
in a source dataset and the relative performance of Lk/Poisson-CH and QRE.
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Figure C.8: Average likelihood ratios of model predictions to random predictions, with 95%
confidence intervals, on feature-based datasets. For NEE the main bar shows performance
averaged over all equilibria and error bars show post-hoc upper and lower bounds on equilibrium
performance.
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